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REALLOCATION OF AN INFINITELY DIVISIBLE GOOD
B. KLAUS, H. PETERS, AND T. STORCKEN
Abstract. We consider the problem of reallocating the total initial
endowments of an in¯nitely divisible commodity among agents with
single-peaked preferences. With the uniform reallocation rule we pro-
pose a solution which satis¯es many appealing properties, describing
the e®ect of population and endowment variations on the outcome. The
central properties which are studied in this context are population mono-
tonicity, bilateral consistency, (endowment) monotonicity and (endow-
ment) strategy-proofness. Furthermore, the uniform reallocation rule
is Pareto optimal and satis¯es several equity conditions, e.g., equal-
treatment and envy-freeness. We study the trade-o® between properties
concerning variation and properties concerning equity. Furthermore, we
provide several characterizations of the uniform reallocation rule based
on these properties.
1. Introduction
In this paper we study situations where the total of initial endowments of
an in¯nitely divisible good is reallocated among a group of agents. In many
cases where free disposal of the good is not allowed (non-price models) it
is natural to assume that the agents' preferences over their shares of the
good are single-peaked. Each agent has an optimal share of the good, below
which and above which preference is decreasing.
There is a wide literature exploring the situation where the problem is re-
duced to the allocation of a total endowment. As described in Sprumont [7],
rationing in a two-good economy in which prices are in disequilibrium can
be interpreted as such a distribution problem with total endowment. A so-
lution for this class of problems satisfying many appealing properties is the
uniform rule. Benassy [2] described the uniform rule as a strategy-proof
rationing scheme: an agent who misrepresents his preference cannot im-
prove his outcome. Sprumont [7] started the axiomatic analysis in 1991. He
proved that the uniform rule is the only rule which satis¯es Pareto opti-
mality, strategy-proofness and anonymity. Ching [3] weakens anonymity to
a condition called equal treatment of equals: agents announcing the same
preferences are treated equally. The axiomatic analysis of Thomson (see [8],
Date. August, 1995.
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[9] and [10]) provides several characterizations of the uniform rule including
consistency and monotonicity properties.
In this paper we study similar properties in the more general setting of
economies where agents have initial endowments. This extension of the
model quite naturally arises if we observe distribution problems with total
endowments where preferences might change over time. Consider for exam-
ple the distribution of a task (e.g., ¯xed amount of teaching hours) among
the members of a group. The (single-peaked) preferences of the agents do
not only depend on the total endowment, but also on external factors (time
for research, other tasks) which are not ¯xed. So, over time, preferences
might change, calling for a reallocation of the task.
Another interpretation of the model can be found in a recent paper of
Barbera, Jackson and Neme [1]. There, sharing problems where agents
might have natural claims, or are treated with di®erent priorities, are stud-
ied. In this setting they characterize the class of distribution rules that are
strategy-proof and Pareto optimal, but which allow for an asymmetric treat-
ment of the agents. Adding a third condition, describing a kind of individual
monotonicity, yields a subclass of strategy-proof and Pareto optimal rules
which they call sequential allotment rules and which they consider to be
a natural extension of the procedure which underlies the uniform rule. By
applying uniform division in the stepwise de¯nition of a sequential allotment
rule, thereby reducing the computation to one step, the uniform reallocation
rule, introduced in Klaus, Peters and Storcken [6], is obtained.
In Klaus, Peters and Storcken [6] the main result is the characterization
of the uniform reallocation rule by Pareto optimality, strategy-proofness and
an equal-treatment condition based on the preferences and the net demands
of the agents. This equity condition, which corresponds to Ching's equal-
treatment condition for division problems, may be replaced by anonymity
and translation invariance.
Like the uniform rule, the uniform reallocation rule satis¯es many desir-
able properties, which we study in the sequel. We can strengthen equal-
treatment to envy-freeness which, in our setting, is formalized in terms of
allotment changes and not in terms of the outcome as in the case of divid-
ing a total endowment. Our ¯rst result (Theorem 3.1) is that, similar to
the total endowment case (see Thomson [10], Lemma 1), the uniform re-
allocation rule is the unique reallocation rule satisfying Pareto optimality,
peaks-onliness and envy-freeness.
Besides strategy-proofness, which describes the in°uence of certain prefer-
ence variations on the outcome, and Pareto optimality, the uniform realloca-
tion rule has several properties incorporating the variation of the remaining
model assumptions.
One such property, introduced by Thomson [8] for the total endowment
case, is population monotonicity. In the reallocation case this property
describes the impact of merging two reallocation problems. We show (The-
REALLOCATION OF AN INFINITELY DIVISIBLE GOOD 3
orem 3.2) that in the characterization of Theorem 3.1 peaks-onliness can be
replaced by population monotonicity.
A further monotonicity property, endowment monotonicity, describes the
change of the solution if certain endowment variations are considered. By
decreasing (increasing) the endowments in case of excess demand (supply),
no individual is better o® than before. This monotonicity condition is an ex-
tension of the one-sided resource-monotonicity of Thomson [10], introduced
for division problems. Thomson proves ([10], Theorem 2) that the uniform
rule is the only rule satisfying Pareto optimality, envy-freeness and one-sided
resource-monotonicity for a restricted domain of single-peaked, continuous
preferences. For the reallocation case a similar result (Theorem 4.4) can be
deduced where the conditions of envy-freeness and monotonicity are adapted
as indicated above. However, the proof of this characterization of the uni-
form reallocation rule is based on a di®erent argument and remains valid for
the whole domain of single-peaked preferences.
The next property of the uniform reallocation rule we study is bilateral
consistency. For the total endowment case, bilateral consistency of a rule
requires the following. Consider a division assigned by a rule and assume
that all agents except two leave with their assigned quantities of the good. If
the remaining agents divide the remaining endowment again by applying the
same rule, then they receive the same shares as before. In Thomson [9] two
characterizations of the uniform rule by means of Pareto optimality, bilat-
eral consistency and continuity in the total amount to divide are provided.
In the ¯rst characterization ([9], Theorem 1) envy-freeness singles out the
uniform rule. In the second characterization ([9], Theorem 2) envy-freeness
is replaced by individual rationality from equal division: no agent, after the
distribution, is worse o® than in the case of equally dividing the total en-
dowment. In a recent study, Dagan shows that the continuity property may
be skipped (see [4], Theorem 2 and Theorem 3).
In reallocation situations bilateral consistency not only prescribes the in-
di®erence of the outcome to the splitting o® of a group in a certain way, but
it also includes an equity component. The leftover of the departing agents is,
up to domain restrictions, equally added to the endowments of the remaining
agents. Individual rationality from equal division in the total endowment
case corresponds quite naturally to individual rationality (with respect to
the initial endowments) in reallocation situations. After the reallocation no
agent is worse o®. The latter two conditions (bilateral consistency and in-
dividual rationality) together with Pareto optimality determine the uniform
reallocation rule for reallocation problems with at least three agents (The-
orem 5.2). For reallocation problems with at least four agents individual
rationality can be replaced by envy-freeness (Theorem 5.3). The proofs of
Dagan's characterizations ([4], Theorem 2 and Theorem 3) can be adapted
to the reallocation case. This yields di®erent proofs of Theorem 5.2 and
Theorem 5.3 for problems with at least four agents. Further characteriza-
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tions of the uniform reallocation rule can be obtained by Pareto optimality,
bilateral consistency and extra conditions, for instance boundedness (of the
outcome) by endowments and peaks (Theorem 5.1).
Finally, endowment strategy-proofness is studied. If initial endowments
are private information it might happen that agents manipulate the out-
come by only reporting|showing|a smaller part of their endowments. Re-
allocation rules where agents cannot pro¯t from withholding parts of their
endowments are called endowment strategy-proof. Endowment strategy-
proofness together with Pareto optimality, bilateral consistency and the
dummy property (agents who have their peak as initial endowment do not
participate in the reallocation) characterizes the uniform reallocation rule
(Theorem 6.3). In Theorem 6.4 we show that we can replace endowment
strategy-proofness and the dummy property by equal-treatment and a prop-
erty called reversibility. This latter condition links the outcomes of excess
demand and excess supply. To be more precise, consider a situation with
demanders, having their peaks above their initial endowments, and suppli-
ers, having their peaks below their initial endowments. Now this situation
is reversed by turning demanders into suppliers with supply equal to their
former demand and suppliers into demanders in a similar way. Reversibility
requires that the allotment changes of the latter problem are opposite to
those of the former.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model and
the uniform reallocation rule. In Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 we introduce the
equity and variation properties which yield several characterizations of the
uniform reallocation rule. An overview over the results is given in Section 7
and the independence of the axioms used in the characterizations is shown.
Furthermore, a discussion of the sensitivity of the model assumptions is
included.
2. Reallocations
Consider exchange economies with a single good for which the agents have
single-peaked (ordinal) utility, for instance strictly concave utility functions
with a global optimum. So, the commodity space is one dimensional: IR+.
Let i be an agent. Then his utility function ui is a continuous function from
IR+ to IR such that
² there is a unique point u^i at which ui is maximal
² for all ®;¯ 2 IR+, ui(®) < ui(¯) if ® < ¯ · u^i or if ® > ¯ ¸ u^i.
The point u^i is called the peak of i. Denote the set of all these utility
functions by U : A set of agents is denoted by N ½ IN . Furthermore, UN
denotes the set of N-tuples u of utility functions. So, u = huiii2N , where
ui is the utility function of agent i. If u; v 2 U
N , then u^ = v^ indicates that
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for every agent i the peak at u (u^i) is equal to that at v (v^i).
A reallocation problem or short a problem is a triple hN; e; ui, where N
is a nonempty and ¯nite set of agents, N ½ IN , e is a vector of initial
endowments e = heiii2N 2 IR
N
+ and u is a pro¯le of utility functions: u 2
UN . At e the initial endowment of agent i is ei.
In problem hN; e; ui agent i is a demander whenever his endowment ei is
strictly less than his peak u^i. In that case he wants more of the good. His
(net) demand is denoted by di(N; e; u), so di(N; e; u) := u^i ¡ ei. Denote
the set of demanders by D(N; e; u). A supplier is an agent j who has an
endowment that is strictly greater than his peak. The supply of such an
agent is sj(N; e; u) := ej ¡ u^j . The set of suppliers is denoted by S(N; e; u).
If agent k is neither a supplier nor a demander, then his peak u^k equals
his endowment ek . In that case he favors no trade, and is called a non-
trader. Let d(N; e; u) :=
P
i2D(N;e;u) di(N; e; u) denote total demand and
s(N; e; u) :=
P
i2S(N;e;u) si(N; e; u) total supply. The excess demand func-
tion z(N; e; u) := d(N; e; u) ¡ s(N; e; u) may be positive, zero, or negative.
If it is positive we say that the problem has excess demand. If it is zero, the
problem is balanced and one would expect that the reallocation is such that
every agent gets his peak. If it is negative, then we have excess supply.
A vector x = hxiii2N 2 IR
N
+
is called feasible (at problem hN; e; ui) or a
reallocation if
P
i2N xi =
P
i2N ei. A reallocation x is called Pareto optimal
(at problem hN; e; ui), if there is no reallocation y = hyiii2N in IR
N
+ , such
that
ui(xi) · ui(yi) for all agents i 2 N and
uj(xj) < uj(yj) for at least one agent j 2 N .
Utility strictly increases, if the peak is approached from above or from
below. Therefore, a reallocation x 2 IRN
+
is Pareto optimal at problem
hN; e; ui, precisely when x is same-sided, i.e., xi · u^i for all i 2 N or xi ¸ u^i
for all i 2 N . Consequently, a reallocation x 2 IRN+ is Pareto optimal if and
only if,
xi · u^i for all i 2 N whenever z(N; e; u) > 0 (excess demand),
xi ¸ u^i for all i 2 N whenever z(N; e; u) < 0 (excess supply), and
xi = u^i for all i 2 N whenever z(N; e; u) = 0 (balancedness).
Sprumont [7] uses same-sidedness as de¯nition of Pareto optimality.
In several properties, discussed hereafter, the number of agents is not
¯xed, therefore solutions will be de¯ned over the set of all problems. To
avoid repetition of the Pareto optimality condition, it is incorporated in the
de¯nition of a rule as follows.
A pre-rule Ã assigns to every problem hN; e; ui a reallocation Ã(N; e; u).
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A rule ' is a Pareto optimal pre-rule.
Let hN; e; ui be a problem and i 2N . Then 'i(N; e; u) denotes the allot-
ment of i under rule ' at problem hN; e; ui. Furthermore, 4'i(N; e; u) :=
'i(N; e; u)¡ ei denotes the actual allotment change for agent i under ' at
hN; e; ui. If N is ¯xed, then we write '(e; u), 'i(e; u), 4'(e; u), 4'i(e; u)
instead of '(N; e; u), 'i(N; e; u), 4'(N; e; u) or 4'i(N; e; u) respectively.
We adopt analogous conventions for the endowment vector e and the pro¯le
of utility functions u.
An agent i is non-satiated under pre-rule Ã at problem hN; e; ui if bui 6=
Ãi(N; e; u).
A special rule is the uniform reallocation rule U r, introduced in [6]. For
a problem hN; e; ui it is de¯ned as follows,
U rj (N; e; u) :=
8<
:
min fu^j ; ej + ¸g if z(N; e; u) > 0 (excess demand)
u^j if z(N; e; u) = 0 (balancedness)
max fu^j ; ej ¡ ¸g if z(N; e; u) < 0 (excess supply)
for every j 2 N , where ¸ ¸ 0 solves
P
i2N U
r
i (N; e; u) =
P
i2N ei.
So, if there is excess demand, then all suppliers and non-traders get their
peaks. Demanders either receive their peaks or get maximal equal allotment
change ¸. In excess supply all non-satiated agents get minimal allotment
change ¡¸. Hence, agents are either satiated or receive the same (maximal
or minimal) allotment change. In fact, combined with Pareto optimality
this exactly determines the uniform reallocation rule:
Lemma 2.1. The uniform reallocation rule is the only rule Ã such that,
for every problem hN; e; ui non-satiated agents
(a) obtain maximal allotment change maxf¢Ãi(N; e; u) j i 2 Ng if the prob-
lem is of excess demand,
(b) obtain minimal allotment change minf¢Ãi(N; e; u) j i 2 Ng if the prob-
lem is of excess supply,
(c) do not exist, if the problem is balanced, i.e., all agents get their peaks.
Proof. By de¯nition, the uniform reallocation rule is same-sided and there-
fore Pareto optimal. Hence, the uniform reallocation rule is actually a rule.
Also by de¯nition, U r satis¯es (a), (b), and (c). Suppose ' is a rule sat-
isfying (a), (b), and (c), and let hN; e; ui be a problem. We prove that
'(N; e; u) = U r(N; e; u). If the problem is balanced then this is obvious, so
we suppose that the problem has excess demand (the excess supply case is
analogous). Hence, z(N; e; u) > 0:
If ei > 'i(N; e; u) for some i 2 N , then by feasibility there is a j 2 N
such that ej < 'j(N; e; u). Hence ¢'i(N; e; u) is not maximal, so by (a) it
follows that in that case 'i(N; e; u) = bui.
So, if i is not satiated, then ¢'i(N; e; u) ¸ 0. Because of same-sidedness
we have bui ¸ 'i(N; e; u) for every i 2 N .
For suppliers i, where ei > bui, this means that bui = 'i(N; e; u).
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For non-traders i, where ei = bui, this also means that bui = 'i(N; e; u).
So, only demanders can be non-satiated, in which case they obtain max-
imal allotment change. Because of same-sidedness, it follows that non-
satiated demanders obtain less than their peaks. But then it follows that
'(N; e; u) = U r(N; e; u).
3. Peaks-only rules
In this section we focus on rules which base the outcomes on the peaks in-
stead of the complete utility functions. The uniform reallocation rule is such
a rule. Moreover, it will appear to be the only rule which satis¯es this condi-
tion and at which no agent envies another one. Furthermore, a monotonic-
ity condition is discussed. It is shown that this condition and envy-freeness
imply the peaks-onliness condition. Because the uniform reallocation rule
satis¯es this condition, this implication yields a second characterization of
this rule.
Let ' be a pre-rule. Then ' is said to be peaks-only if for all problems
hN; e; ui and hN 0; e0; u0i, with N = N 0, e = e0 and u^ = u^0,
'(N; e; u) = '(N 0; e0; u0):
So, a rule ' is peaks-only if, and only if, the outcomes only depend on
the peaks of the utility functions and not on the whole functions. As a
manner of speaking, peaks-only rules ignore intensities. Nevertheless, many
well-known rules are peaks-only. The uniform rule, the proportional rule,
equal division and hierarchical rules, rules which are discussed in Section 7,
are peaks-only. It is evident that by its de¯nition the uniform reallocation
rule is also peaks-only. Clearly, if a rule takes intensities into account, then
it is apt to be vulnerable to strategic behavior and more di±cult to apply.
The pre-rule ' is said to be envy-free if for all problems hN; e; ui and all
individuals i; j 2 N with ¢'j(N; e; u) + ei ¸ 0,
ui(¢'j(N; e; u) + ei) · ui('i(N; e; u)):
So, i envies j if i prefers j's allotment change, added to his endowment, to
his own allotment|provided the former is feasible. The uniform reallocation
rule is envy-free. For instance, in case of excess demand, only demanders
can be non-satiated and, if so, they obtain the same, maximal allotment
change.
The well-known property of envy-freeness was introduced by Foley [5]
for resource allocation problems. Envy-freeness for division problems with
single-peaked preferences was ¯rst used by Sprumont in his axiomatic anal-
ysis of the uniform rule, [7].
The following theorem characterizes the uniform reallocation rule as the
only rule which is envy-free and peaks-only.1 The main idea of the proof
1Here as well as elsewhere in the paper, the expression \characterization" implies the
logical independence of the characterizing axioms. For all characterizations appearing
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is that, because of these two properties, allotment changes for non-satiated
agents are maximal or minimal, depending on whether the problem is in
excess demand or in excess supply. As this typically describes the uniform
reallocation rule, we are done.
The theorem and its proof are similar to Lemma 3 and its proof in Thom-
son [10], which treats the case of total endowment instead of initial endow-
ments.
Theorem 3.1. The uniform reallocation rule is the only envy-free and peaks-
only rule.
Proof. Clearly, the uniform reallocation rule is an envy-free and peaks-only
rule. In order to prove that it is the only one let ' be an envy-free and
peaks-only rule. Let hN; e; ui be a problem. We prove that '(N; e; u) =
U r(N; e; u). By Pareto optimality, it follows immediately that '(N; e; u) =
U r(N; e; u) = u^ if z(N; e; u) = 0 (balancedness). Without loss of gener-
ality suppose that z(N; e; u) > 0 (excess demand). By Lemma 2.1 it is
su±cient to prove that non-satiated agents get maximal allotment changes
at '. Let i 2 N be a non-satiated agent at '(N; e; u). Hence, by same-
sidedness, 'i(N; e; u) < u^i. Consider the allotment change 4'j(N; e; u)
of an arbitrary agent j. As there is a utility pro¯le v 2 UN , such that
v^ = u^ and vi (x) > vi('i(N; e; u)) for all x > 'i(N; e; u), it follows by envy-
freeness and peaks-onliness that 4'j(N; e; u) + ei · 'i(N; e; u). Hence,
4'j(N; e; u) · 4'i(N; e; u).
The following characterization of the uniform reallocation rule involves
population monotonicity. Loosely speaking, a rule is population monotonic
if merging two disjoint problems either both of excess demand or both of
excess supply, makes in one subgroup either all agents weakly better o® or
all agents weakly worse o®. So, if we add a demander to a problem hN; e; ui
with excess demand, yielding problem hN 0; e0; u0i, then either all agents in
N weakly prefer the outcome at hN; e; ui to that at hN 0; e0; u0i or all agents
in N prefer it the other way around.
A pre-rule ' is said to be population monotonic, if for all problems hN; e; ui
and hN 0; e0; u0i, such that z(N; e; u) ¢ z(N 0; e0; u0) > 0 and N \N 0 = ;,
either ui('i(N; e; u)) ¸ ui('i(N [N
0; he; e0i; hu; u0i)) for all i 2 N
or ui('i(N; e; u)) · ui('i(N [N
0; he; e0i; hu; u0i)) for all i 2 N:
Here he; e0i is the vector x in IRN[N
0
+
such that xi = ei for all i 2 N and
xi = e
0
i for all i 2 N
0. The pro¯le hu; u0i 2 UN[N
0
has a similar meaning.
Note that z(N; e; u) ¢ z(N 0; e0; u0) > 0 if, and only if, both problems have
in this paper, however, the proof of logical independence of the axioms is postponed to
Section 7.
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excess demand or both problems have excess supply.
The uniform reallocation rule is population monotonic. To see this, let
hN; e; ui and hN 0; e0; u0i be two problems with excess demand. Let ¸, ¸0
and ¹ be the maximal allotment changes of U r in the problems hN; e; ui,
hN 0; e0; u0i and hN [N 0; he; e0i; hu; u0ii respectively. Let i; j 2 N . Suppose i
is strictly better o® at hN; e; ui than at hN [N 0; he; e0i; hu; u0ii. Suppose for
j the converse holds. Then i and j must be demanders. Hence, the agents
i and j are not satiated at problem hN [ N 0; he; e0i; hu; u0ii and hN; e; ui
respectively. So,
¹ = 4'i(N [N
0; he; e0i; hu; u0i) <4'i(N; e; u) · ¸ and
¸ = 4'j(N; e; u) <4'j(N [N
0; he; e0i; hu; u0i) · ¹.
Because this cannot be true, all agents in N are either weakly better o®
in hN; e; ui than in hN [N 0; he; e0i; hu; u0i, or all are weakly worse o®. The
proof for problems with excess supply is similar.
Hence, the uniform reallocation rule is population monotonic. Moreover,
the following theorem shows that envy-freeness and population monotonicity
characterize the uniform reallocation rule.
Theorem 3.2. The uniform reallocation rule is the only envy-free and pop-
ulation monotonic rule.
Proof. In order to prove that U r is the only envy-free and population mono-
tonic rule suppose ' is such a rule. It is su±cient to prove that ' is peaks-
only. Let hN; e; ui be a problem and v 2 UN such that u^ = v^. With-
out loss of generality let N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng and suppose z(N; e; u) > 0.
Consider N 0 = fn+ 1; : : : ; 2ng. Take e0 2 IRN
0
such that e0i+n = ei for
all i 2 N . Let u0 2 UN
0
be such that u0i+n = vi for all i 2 N . It
is su±cient to show that 'i(N; e; u) = 'i+n(N
0; e0; u0), because this also
implies 'i(N; e; v) = 'i+n(N
0; e0; u0). Clearly, z(N 0; e0; u0) > 0. Consider
hN [N 0; he; e0i; hu; u0ii. Then z(N [N 0; he; e0i; hu; u0i) > 0. Envy-freeness
and same-sidedness imply for all i 2 N ,
'i(N [N
0; he; e0i; hu; u0i) = 'i+n(N [N
0; he; e0i; hu; u0i) · u^i = u^
0
i+n.
Population monotonicity, same-sidedness and feasibility imply for all i 2 N ,
'i(N [N
0; he; e0i; hu; u0i) = 'i(N; e; u).
Similarly for all i 2 N 0 it follows that
'i(N [N
0; he; e0i; hu; u0i) = 'i(N
0; e0; u0).
Hence, for i 2 N , 'i(N; e; u) = 'i+n(N
0; e0; u0).
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4. Monotonicity
This section provides a characterization of the uniform reallocation rule
which is based on an endowment monotonicity property. Endowment mono-
tonicity means that if, in case of excess demand, the individual endowments
decrease (or increase in case of excess supply), then no individual is better
o® after the change. The characterization says that the uniform reallocation
rule is the only rule which is endowment monotonic and envy-free.
The stages of the proof of this characterization are as follows. First it is
shown that endowment monotonicity and Pareto optimality imply coordi-
natewise continuity. Then another preliminary result is obtained. It says
that endowment monotonic and envy-free rules have the dummy property.
This latter condition means that non-traders are left on their endowments,
hence receive zero allotment change. Next we show that endowment mono-
tonic rules which satisfy the dummy property, assign allotments somewhere
between the individual endowments and peaks. With these results the char-
acterization follows easily.
Let ' be a rule. Because the properties, dealt with in this section, leave
the group size and utilities unchanged, we ¯x the set of agents at N and
the pro¯le of utility functions at u. Moreover, a problem hN; e; ui is now
denoted by e. Let x and y be two vectors in IRN
+
. Then x ¸ y means that
xi ¸ yi for all i 2 N .
We say that the pre-rule ' is endowment monotonic or monotonic, if for
all problems e and e0 such that e · e0,
if z(e0) ¸ 0, then ui('i(e)) · ui('i(e
0)) for all i 2 N , and(1)
if z(e) · 0, then ui('i(e
0)) · ui('i(e)) for all i 2 N .(2)
In [10], Thomson introduced endowment monotonicity properties for di-
vision problems. His one-sided resource-monotonicity corresponds to our
monotonicity property.
Under same-sidedness monotonicity is equivalent to 'i(e) · 'i(e
0) for all
i 2 N and all e · e0 in IRN+ such that z(e
0) ¸ 0 or z(e) · 0. By this it
follows easily that U r is monotonic.
For all e 2 IRN+ , ® 2 IR+ and i 2 N , let e(®; i) denote a vector of
endowments such that e(®; i)k = ek if k 2 N ¡ fig and e(®; i)i = ®. So,
e(®; i) is a unilateral change of e by agent i. Furthermore, ® denotes i's
endowment in that change.
The pre-rule ' is said to be coordinatewise continuous if for all i 2 N and
all e 2 IRN
+ the function ® 7¡! 'i(e(®; i)) is continuous.
The following lemma says that monotonic rules are coordinatewise contin-
uous. A similar result for allocation problems, without initial endowments,
can be found in Thomson [10] (in the proof of Theorem 2).
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Lemma 4.1. Let ' be a monotonic rule. Then ' is coordinatewise contin-
uous.
Proof. Let ®1; ®2; : : : ; ®t; : : : be a sequence in IR+ converging to ® 2 IR+,
and let x := '(e(®; i)) and xt := '(e(®t; i)) for some ¯xed i 2 N and all
t 2 IN . We want to show that xt converges to x. Without loss of generality
suppose that ®1 < ®2 < ®3 < : : : < ®. We distinguish two cases.
Case 1: z(e(®; i)) ¸ 0:
Then z(e(®t; i)) > 0 for all t 2 IN . Hence, by same-sidedness, it follows
that x · u^ and xt · u^ for all t 2 IN . Now, by monotonicity, xt · x for all
t 2 IN and the sequence x1; x2; : : : ; xt; : : : is non-decreasing. By feasibility,
it follows that X
j2N
xtj =
X
j2N
e(®t; i)j and
X
j2N
xj =
X
j2N
e(®; i)j .
Because e(®t; i) converges to e(®; i), xt converges to x.
Case 2: z(e(®; i)) < 0:
Then there is a number t0 such that z(e(®
t; i)) < 0 for all t ¸ t0. Without
loss of generality let t0 = 1. The proof proceeds similar to Case 1.
A pre-rule ' is said to have the dummy property, if for all non-traders j
at problem e the allotment change is zero, i.e., 'j(e) = ej .
Lemma 4.2. Let ' be a monotonic and envy-free rule. Then ' has the
dummy property.
Proof. Suppose at problem e, 'j(e) 6= ej for some non-trader j. This implies
that z(e) 6= 0 because otherwise, by Pareto optimality, every agent gets his
peak. We assume z(e) > 0, the other case is similar.
By same-sidedness 'j(e) < buj = ej . Furthermore, by monotonicity it is
without loss of generality (lower the endowments if necessary) to assume
that all agents, except agent j, have either maximal demand or zero as
initial endowment, i.e., for all i 2 N ¡ fjg, ei = max fu^i ¡m; 0g, where
m := maxi 6=j fu^i ¡ eig. Here, m > 0 because z(e) > 0. Let ® :=4'j(e) < 0
denote the allotment change of agent j. For 0 · " · ¡® we consider the
following endowment vector:
~e(")i :=
½
ei if i 6= j
'j (e) + " if i = j.
Hence, 'j(e) · ~e(")j · ej . Furthermore, denote the allotment changes at
~e(") by ®"i :=4'i(~e(")) for all i 2 N . By envy-freeness between j and agents
i 2 N ¡ fjg and monotonicity it follows that, for all i 6= j and 0 · " · ¡®:
~e(")j + ®
"
i > u^j or ~e(")j + ®
"
i · ~e(")j + ®
"
j = 'j(e(")) · 'j(e).
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Because u^j ¡ ~e(")j = ¡® ¡ " this implies for all i 6= j:
®"i > ¡® ¡ " or ®
"
i · ®
"
j · 'j(e)¡ e(")j < 0 for all 0 < " · ¡®.
(3)
Now we prove that ®"i ¸ 0 for all i 6= j and 0 < " · ¡®. Suppose, to the
contrary, that ®"i < 0 for some i 6= j and 0 < " · ¡®. Then e(")i = ei > 0.
So bui ¡ ei = m ¸ buk ¡ ek for all k 6= j. So, because by same-sidednessbuk ¸ ®"k + e(")k = ®"k + ek, it follows that bui ¸ ®"k + e(")i for all k 6= j.
Because i does not envy k, we must have ®"
k
· ®"i < 0 for all k 6= j. Hence,
®"
k
< 0 for all k 2 N . This, however, contradicts feasibility. So, ®"
k
¸ 0 for
all k 6= j, and (3) implies:
®"i > ¡®¡ " for all i 6= j and all 0 < " · ¡®.(4)
By monotonicity we have for all 0 · " · ¿ · ¡® and all i 6= j:
®¿i ¸ ®
"
i .(5)
Now (5) and (4) together imply:
®"i ¸ ¡® for all i 6= j and all 0 < " · ¡®.(6)
By coordinatewise continuity (Lemma 4.1) (6) implies ®0i ¸ ¡®. This is
only possible if N = fi; jg, ®0i = ¡® and ®
0
j = ®. Hence, j envies i.
A pre-rule ' is bounded by endowments and peaks, if for all problems e
and all i 2 N
either ei · 'i(e) · u^i or u^i · 'i(e) · ei.
Boundedness by endowments and peaks implies the dummy property.
Furthermore, boundedness by endowments and peaks implies individual ra-
tionality, i.e., for all problems e and all i 2 N
ui(ei) · ui('i(e)).
The following lemma says that under monotonicity and same-sidedness
the dummy property is equivalent to boundedness by endowments and peaks.
Lemma 4.3. Let ' be a monotonic rule which has the dummy property.
Then ' is bounded by endowments and peaks.
Proof. Let e be a problem. Without loss of generality suppose z(e) > 0.
By same-sidedness, 'i(e) · u^i for all i 2 N . Suppose j 2 N , such that
'j(e) < u^j . It su±ces to prove that ej · 'j(e). Consider ¹e 2 IR
N
+ , with
¹ei = ei for all i 2 D(e) and ¹ei = u^i for all i =2 D(e). By monotonicity,
'i(¹e) · 'i(e) for all i 2 N . By the dummy property, 'i(¹e) = u^i for all
i =2 D(¹e). Therefore j 2 D(e) = D(¹e). By monotonicity it is su±cient to
prove that ej = ¹ej · 'j(¹e). Suppose 'j(¹e) < ¹ej .
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Consider ~e 2 IRN+ , such that ~ei = ¹ei for all i 2 N ¡ fjg and ~ej = u^j .
Because 'j(¹e) < ¹ej , it follows by same-sidedness and feasibility that D(¹e) 6=
fjg. Hence z(~e) > 0. Therefore by monotonicity we have
'i (¹e) · 'i(~e) for all i 2 N .
By feasibility this yields 'j (~e) · 'j(¹e) + u^j ¡ ¹ej < u^j = ~ej . This, however,
contradicts the dummy property. So, 'j(¹e) ¸ ¹ej .
Finally, we can prove the characterization of this section.
Theorem 4.4. The uniform reallocation rule is the only rule which is envy-
free and monotonic.
Proof. The uniform reallocation rule satis¯es both properties. In order to
prove that it is the only one let ' be a rule with these properties, and
consider problem e. Without loss of generality suppose z(e) > 0.
By same-sidedness and boundedness by endowments and peaks (Lem-
mas 4.2 and 4.3) it follows that 'i(e) = u^i for all i =2 D(e). By Lemma 2.1
it is su±cient to prove that non-satiated agents get maximal allotment
change. Let i; j 2 D(e), such that 'i (e) < u^i. Then we have to show
that 4'j(e) · 4'i(e).
Suppose 4'i(e) < 4'j(e). Because of envy-freeness, ei +4'j(e) > u^i.
Take k 2 S(e). Consider e(®; k), ® · ek and ® ¡! u^k. By coordinatewise
continuity, monotonicity and envy-freeness it follows that
e(®0; k)i +4'j(e(®
0; k)) > u^i, where ®
0 = u^k.
Note that k is a non-trader at problem e(®0; k). Hence, the set of suppliers
has been decreased by one. Repeating this process yields a problem, say ~e,
such that ~el = el for all l 2 D(e), ~ek = u^k for all k =2 D(e) and
~ei +4'j(~e) = ei +4'j(~e) > u^i.
In particular, we have 4'j(~e) > 0. But then either feasibility or bounded-
ness by endowments and peaks is violated.
Results on endowment monotonicity for allocation rules can be found
in Thomson [10]. There, a characterization of the uniform allocation rule
for a restricted class of single-peaked preferences2 by one-sided resource-
monotonicity and envy-freeness is derived. Theorem 4.4, which can be seen
as an extension of this result to the reallocation case, is based on a di®erent
proof technique, and holds for the whole domain of single-peaked prefer-
ences.
2The function r : IR+ ¡! IR+ [ f1g which assigns to each point either the corre-
sponding indi®erence point on the other side of the peak, and zero or in¯nity if such a
indi®erence point does not exists, has to be bounded.
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5. Consistency
In this section two characterizations of the uniform reallocation rule are
discussed. Consistency means that under the mechanism at hand subgroups
of agents do not redistribute their subtotal di®erently. So, if a group of
agents leaves with their allotments, then, loosely speaking, applying the
mechanism on the remaining agents yields the same outcome as before. Ac-
tually, our characterizations only involve bilateral consistency, which means
that only situations where two agents remain are considered. First we prove
that the uniform reallocation rule is the only rule which is bilateral consis-
tent and bounded by endowments and peaks. Then we show that replacing
the latter condition by the weaker individual rationality condition, yields a
second characterization of the uniform reallocation rule. Finally we show
that for problems with at least four agents, bilateral consistency and envy-
freeness determine the uniform reallocation rule.
A pre-rule ' is said to be bilaterally consistent, if for all problems hN; e; ui
and all agents i; j 2N , i 6= j,
'i
³
fi; jg; e(i; j); ujfi;jg
´
= 'i (N; e; u) .
Here, ujfi;jg = hu(i); u(j)i denotes the restriction of u to fi; jg and the
adjusted endowment vector e(i; j) 2 IR
fi;jg
+
is de¯ned as follows. Without
loss of generality suppose 4'i(N; e; u) · 4'j(N; e; u). Then,
e(i; j)j := max
½
0; ej +
1
2
(4'i(N; e; u) +4'j(N; e; u))
¾
and
e(i; j)i := ei + (4'i(N; e; u) +4'j(N; e; u))¡ (e(i; j)j ¡ ej) .
So, endowment adjustments are as close as possible3 to the mean allotment
changes of i and j. It is straightforward to prove that the adjusted endow-
ments e(i; j)j and e(i; j)i are non-negative. Furthermore, if 4'i(N; e; u) ¸
0, we obtain mean allotment changes
e(i; j)j := ej +
1
2
(4'i(N; e; u) +4'j(N; e; u)) and
e(i; j)i := ei +
1
2
(4'i(N; e; u) +4'j(N; e; u)) .
The bilateral consistency property for reallocation problems, is based on
Thomson's bilateral consistency for allocation problems, see [9]. There,
bilateral consistency is de¯ned with respect to the remaining total endow-
ment, which is left after the departure of all except two agents with their
allotments. Then, dividing the remaining (total) endowment among the two
agents, applying the same allocation rule, yields the same outcome as before.
3By just applying mean allotment changes negative endowments, which are not ad-
missable in this model, might occur.
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In the reallocation case, however, we ¯rst have to distribute the leftover
among the two agents to get a reduced reallocation problem. So, bilateral
consistency in this setting means that if two agents have to redivide their
allotments according to the same rule, then this redivision is equal to the
original outcome, provided that they start from adjusted endowments.
It is straightforward to prove that the uniform reallocation rule is bilat-
erally consistent.
The next theorem characterizes this rule as described before.
Theorem 5.1. The uniform reallocation rule is the only rule which is bi-
lateral consistent and bounded by endowments and peaks.
Proof. Let ' be such a rule and hN; e; ui a problem. It is su±cient to
prove that '(N; e; u) = U r(N; e; u). Without loss of generality suppose
z(N; e; u) > 0; the case of excess supply or balancedness is similar. By
boundedness by endowments and peaks and same-sidedness, 'i(N; e; u) = u^i
for all non-demanders i =2 D(N; e; u). Now, by Lemma 2.1, it is su±cient to
show that non-satiated demanders get maximal allotment changes. Let i; j 2
D(N; e; u) such that 'i(N; e; u) < u^i. We have to show that 4'i(N; e; u) ¸
4'j(N; e; u).
To the contrary, suppose
4'j(N; e; u) >4'i(N; e; u):(7)
Because of boundedness by endowments and peaks 4'i(N; e; u) ¸ 0. So,
e(i; j)j 6= 0. Consider problem
D
fi; jg ; e(i; j); ujfi;jg
E
. By bilateral consis-
tency,
'i
³
fi; jg ; e(i; j); ujfi;jg
´
= 'i(N; e; u):
Because e(i; j)i = ei +
1
2
(4'i(N; e; u) +4'j(N; e; u)) and (7) we have
'i(N; e; u) < e(i; j)i.
If e(i; j)i · u^i, then obviously boundedness by endowments and peaks is
violated. If e(i; j)i > u^i, then by boundedness by endowments and peaks
'i
³
fi; jg ; e(i; j); ujfi;jg
´
¸ u^i.
But as 'i
³
fi; jg ; e(i; j); ujfi;jg
´
= 'i(N; e; u) < u^i, this cannot be the case.
Hence, we have a contradiction and are done.
Note that Theorem 5.1 holds also if we ¯x N .
The following theorem shows that under Pareto optimality and bilateral
consistency the boundedness condition of the previous theorem and individ-
ual rationality are equivalent if there are at least three agents.
Theorem 5.2. For problems with at least three agents, the uniform reallo-
cation rule is the only individually rational and bilaterally consistent rule.
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Proof. Let ' be an individually rational and bilaterally consistent rule. It
is su±cient to prove that ' is bounded by endowments and peaks (Theo-
rem 5.1). Let hN; e; ui be a problem. Without loss of generality suppose
z(N; e; u) > 0; the excess supply or balancedness case is similar. By indi-
vidual rationality and same-sidedness,
ej · 'j(N; e; u) · u^j for all j =2 S(N; e; u).
Take a supplier i 2 S(N; e; u), then by same-sidedness 'i(N; e; u) · u^i. Now
suppose that 'i(N; e; u) < u^i. We deduce a contradiction and are done.
By feasibility and individual rationality there is a demander j 2 D(N; e; u)
such that
4'j(N; e; u) > 0.(8)
By bilateral consistency
'i(N; e; u) = 'i
³
fi; jg ; e(i; j); ujfi;jg
´
.(9)
It follows from (8) that e(i; j)i > 'i(N; e; u). So, by individual rationality,
(9), and bui > 'i(N; e; u),
e(i; j)i ¸ u^i > 'i(N; e; u):(10)
Let M = fi; j; lg, where l =2 fi; jg. Take ¹e 2 IRN
+ such that ¹ek = e(i; j)k
for k 2 fi; jg and ¹el = e(i; j)i. Take u
0 2 UM such that u0jfi;jg = ujfi;jg and
u^0
l
= ¹el. So, the problem
D
fi; jg ; e(i; j); ujfi;jg
E
is enlarged with a non-trader
l and this yields hM; ¹e; u0i. By individual rationality 'l (M; ¹e; u
0) = u^0
l
= ¹el.
So, ¹e(i; j) = e(i; j). Because u0jfi;jg = ujfi;jg, by bilateral consistency and
(9),
'k
¡
M; ¹e; u0
¢
= 'k
³
fi; jg ; e(i; j); ujfi;jg
´
= 'k(N; e; u) for k 2 fi; jg .
Hence, by bilateral consistency we have for k 2 fi; lg
'k
¡
M; ¹e; u0
¢
= 'k
³
fi; lg ; ¹e(i; l); u0jfi;lg
´
.
Since 4'l (M; ¹e; u
0) = 0 and because of the choice of ¹el and (10)
¹e(i; l)i = ¹ei +
1
2
¡
4'i
¡
M; ¹e; u0
¢
+4'l
¡
M; ¹e; u0
¢¢
= ¹ei +
1
2
4'i
¡
M; ¹e; u0
¢
= ¹ei +
1
2
¡
'i
¡
M; ¹e; u0
¢
¡ ¹ei
¢
=
1
2
e(i; j)i +
1
2
'i(N; e; u) > 'i(N; e; u).
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By individual rationality ¹e(i; l)i ¸ u^i > 'i(N; e; u). By adding non-traders
in this manner we obtain a sequence ¹et(i; lt) such that
¹et(i; lt)i ¸ u^i > 'i(N; e; u) and
¹et(i; lt)i =
µ
1
2
¶t
e(i; j)i +
tX
k=1
µ
1
2
¶k
'i(N; e; u)
=
µ
1
2
¶t
e(i; j)i +
Ã
1¡
µ
1
2
¶t!
'i(N; e; u) for all t 2 IN .
This obviously yields a contradiction.
The previous theorem holds if we ¯x N and if N has at least three agents.
For ¯xed N with two agents the theorem does not hold, because in that
situation bilateral consistency has no impact.
The last characterization in this section is obtained by extending a re-
sult of Dagan ([4], Lemma 2) to reallocation rules and applying bilateral
consistency and Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 5.3. For problems with at least four agents, the uniform realloca-
tion rule is the unique rule satisfying envy-freeness and bilateral consistency.
As already mentioned above, we use in the proof of Theorem 5.3 the
following extension of a result of Dagan ([4], Lemma 2) for allocation rules.
Lemma 5.4. Let there be at least four agents. If a rule is bilaterally con-
sistent and envy-free, then the rule satis¯es peaks-onliness for all two-person
problems.
The proof of Lemma 5.4 is similar to the proof of Dagan's result [4],
Lemma 2.
Proof. Let ' be a bilaterally consistent and envy-free rule and consider the
two-person problem hN; e; ui, N = fi; jg. To show peaks-onliness we have
to prove that for utility functions u; u0 with u^ = u^0 it holds that
'(N; e; u) = '(N; e; u0):
Because there are at least four agents, we can consider the problem
hN 0; e; u0i, N 0 = fk; lg such that N \N 0 = ; and u^i = u^
0
k
, u^j = u^
0
l
. Merging
the two problems yields (N [N 0; he; ei ; hu; u0i). By Pareto optimality
'm
¡
N [N 0; he; ei ;
­
u; u0
®¢
·
­
u; u0
®
for all m 2 N [N 0 or
'm
¡
N [N 0; he; ei ; hu; u0i
¢
¸
­
u; u0
®
, for all m 2 N [N 0.
Then, by envy-freeness
'i
¡
N [N 0; he; ei ; hu; u0i
¢
= 'k
¡
N [N 0; he; ei ; hu; u0i
¢
and(11)
'j
¡
N [N 0; he; ei ; hu; u0i
¢
= 'l
¡
N [N 0; he; ei ; hu; u0i
¢
.
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By applying bilateral consistency onN andN 0 as remaining agents we obtain
'm (N; e; u) = 'm
¡
N [N 0; he; ei ; hu; u0i
¢
, m 2 N , and(12)
'n
¡
N 0; e; u0
¢
= 'n
¡
N [N 0; he; ei ; hu; u0i
¢
, n 2 N 0.
Equation (11) together with (12) yields
' (N; e; u) = '
¡
N 0; e; u0
¢
.(13)
Now, by applying a similar argument as above to the problems hN 0; e; u0i
and hN; e; u0i it follows that
'(N 0; e; u0) = '(N; e; u0):(14)
Hence, ((13) and (14)) the lemma is proven.
Proof of Theorem 5.3. Let ' be a bilaterally consistent and envy-free rule.
Then, bilateral consistency together with Lemma 5.4 implies peaks-onliness
for problems with an arbitrary number of agents n ¸ 4. Then, by Theo-
rem 3.1 the rule ' equals the uniform reallocation rule for problems with at
least four agents.
In Thomson [9] and Dagan [4] results similar to those described in The-
orem 5.2 and Theorem 5.3 are given for allocation rules. Thomson includes
a continuity condition in his characterizations ([9], Theorem 1, Theorem 2),
besides bilateral consistency, individual rationality from equal division or
envy-freeness respectively. Dagan proves that the results of Thomson remain
true without continuity for allocation problems with at least four agents ([4],
Theorem 2, Theorem 3). Now, \translating" the steps of the proofs4 in Da-
gans characterizations into the reallocation setting is almost su±cient to
get alternative proofs of Theorem 5.2 and Theorem 5.3. The argument of
converse consistency (see [4], Lemma 4), which completes the proofs of the
characterizations, however, has no equivalent in the reallocation setting. By
assuming that a rule, satisfying the characterizing properties, does not equal
the uniform reallocation rule, and using bilateral consistency, a contradic-
tion, which completes the alternative proofs, is easily derived.
6. Strategy-Proofness
In this section we discuss characterizations of the uniform reallocation
rule in which endowment strategy-proofness plays a prominent role. This
condition makes sense in those situations where the initial endowments are
private information and the preferences are known. It guarantees, so to
speak, that withholding some of the endowment by an agent is not pro¯table
for that agent, whatever the other agents do. So, truth-telling is a weakly
dominant strategy. If agents were also allowed to o®er more than their
actually possession, then feasibility could cause that some agents obtain a
negative allocation. Because our model does not allow such assignments,
4[4], Lemmas 2, 3, 5 and 6 can be proved in their \reallocation version ".
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supplies are considered to be real amounts handed out to the mechanism.
Then, demands can be faked only by withholding endowment.
A pre-rule ' is said to be (endowment) strategy-proof, if for all problems
hN; e; ui, all agents i 2 N and all e0 2 IRN+ , with e
0
j = ej for all j 2 N ¡ fig
and e0i · ei,
ui ('i (N; e; u)) ¸ ui
¡
ei +¢'i(N; e
0; u)
¢
.
If i acts strategically and pretends to have e0i instead of ei, then the rule
' assigns 'i(N; e
0; u) to i. But, as endowments are private information, '
can better be interpreted as a reallocation which assigns allotment changes.
So, i's actual allotment in that situation is ei +4'i (N; e
0; u). Therefore,
strategy-proofness is de¯ned in this way. It means that i cannot envy himself
in a situation of withholding endowment.
The following Lemma shows that if a rule is strategy-proof, then withhold-
ing endowment by non-satiated agents yields a smaller allotment change, in
case of excess demand, and a greater allotment change, in case of excess
supply.
Lemma 6.1. Let ' be a strategy-proof rule. Let hN; e; ui be a problem and
i 2 N such that 'i (N; e; u) 6= u^i. Let e
0 2 IRN
+
such that ej = e
0
j
for all
j 2 N ¡ fig and ei ¸ e
0
i. Then:
If z(N; e0; u) · 0, then ¢'i (N; e
0; u) ¸ ¢'i(N; e; u), and
if z(N; e; u) > 0, then ¢'i (N; e
0; u) · ¢'i(N; e; u).
Proof. Suppose z(N; e0; u) · 0. Then 'i (N; e; u) > u^i by same-sidedness.
Let f := min fx 2 IR+ j ui(x) ¸ ui('i (N; e; u))g. Obviously, f < u^i. By
strategy-proofness it follows that 'i (N; e
0; u)¡ e0
i
+ ei · f or 'i (N; e
0; u)¡
e0
i
+ ei ¸ 'i (N; e; u). Because ei ¸ e
0
i
and f < u^i · 'i (N; e
0; u) by same-
sidedness, the former cannot be true. The latter implies the desired result.
Suppose z(N; e; u) > 0. Then 'i (N; e; u) < u^i by same-sidedness. Let
f := sup fx 2 IR+ j ui(x) ¸ ui('i (N; e; u))g. Obviously, f > u^i. Suppose
ei ¡ e
0
i < f ¡ u^i. By strategy-proofness 'i (N; e
0; u) ¡ e0i + ei · 'i (N; e; u)
or 'i (N; e
0; u)¡ e0
i
+ ei ¸ f . Because ei¡ e
0
i
< f ¡ u^i · f ¡'i (N; e
0; u), by
same-sidedness, it follows that the latter cannot be the case. The ¯rst yields
the desired result. In case of ei ¡ e
0
i
¸ f ¡ u^i, we shift ei stepwise (with the
size of the steps small enough) to e0i and apply the same argument as above
in each step.
We have the following consequence of the previous lemma.
Corollary 6.2. Let ' be a strategy-proof rule. Let hN; e; ui be a problem
with excess demand. Then,
ei · 'i (N; e; u) · u^i for all i 2 D(N; e; u), and
'j (N; e; u) = u^j for all j =2 D(N; e; u).
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Proof. By same-sidedness, 'k (N; e; u) · u^k for all k 2 N . For all k 2 N let
e(k) 2 IRN
+
such that e(k)l = el for all l 2 N ¡fkg and e(k)k = 0. Take k 2
N . Suppose 'k (N; e; u) < u^k. Then 4'k (N; e(k); u) · 4'k (N; e; u) by
Lemma 6.1. Because 'k (N; e(k); u) ¸ 0, it follows that 4'k (N; e(k); u) ¸
0. So, 4'k (N; e; u) ¸ 0. Therefore ek · 'k (N; e; u). So, k 2 D(N; e; u).
This completes the proof.
A similar result cannot be obtained for the excess supply case, even if
there were an upper bound for the endowments. (For instance, if there are
¯nite resources.) This is due to the asymmetry in the de¯nition, caused by
the requirement of e0i · ei. Therefore, strategy-proofness as de¯ned here,
has not such a great impact on the solution as one would expect. The
following theorem characterizes the uniform reallocation rule as the only
strategy-proof and bilaterally consistent rule which has the dummy property.
Recalling Theorem 5.2, Theorem 6.3 implies that, if there are at least three
agents, under bilateral consistency and Pareto optimality, strategy-proofness
together with the dummy property is equivalent to individual rationality.
Theorem 6.3. The uniform reallocation rule is the only rule which is bi-
laterally consistent, strategy-proof, and has the dummy property.
Proof. In order to prove that U r is the only rule with these properties, let
' be such a rule. Let hN; e; ui be a problem. If there is excess demand
we are done by Corollary 6.2 and Theorem 5.1. For z(N; e; u) = 0, Pareto
optimality implies '(N; e; u) = U r(N; e; u). Therefore suppose z(N; e; u) <
0. We prove that ' is bounded by endowments and peaks at hN; e; ui. Then
in view of Theorem 5.1 we are done.
By same-sidedness for all k 2 N ,
'k(N; e; u) ¸ u^k.
Let j 2 S(N; e; u). Consider e0 2 IRN+ such that e
0
k
= ek for all k 2 N ¡ fjg
and e0j = max fu^j ; ej ¡ s(N; e; u) + d(N; e; u)g. So, at hN; e
0; ui agent j is
either a non-trader or at e0 demand equals supply. Therefore, 'j(N; e
0; u) =
u^j . So, 4'j(N; e
0; u) · 0. By Lemma 6.1 we have
4'j(N; e; u) · 4'j(N; e
0; u) · 0:
So, ej ¸ 'j(N; e; u) ¸ u^j .
Let j 2 D(N; e; u). It is su±cient to prove that 'j(N; e; u) · u^j . Suppose,
to the contrary, that 'j(N; e; u) > u^j . Then, by feasibility, there is a supplier
i. So, 4'i(N; e; u) · 0 by the previous step of the proof. By bilateral
consistency
'j
³
fi; jg ; e(i; j); ujfi;jg
´
= 'j(N; e; u).
Because4'i(N; e; u) · 0, e(i; j)j < 'j(N; e; u). Above, we proved that sup-
pliers obtain an allotment change between their peak and their endowment.
Therefore, at
D
fi; jg ; e(i; j); ujfi;jg
E
j cannot be a supplier. So, e(i; j)j · u^j .
Now, similarly as in the proof of Theorem 5.2, by introducing a sequence
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of non-traders l1; l2; : : : ; lt; : : : we obtain a sequence of endowments e(i; lt)j
converging to 'j(fj; ltg ; e(j; lt); ujfj;ltg) = 'j(N; e; u) > u^j , where j cannot
be a supplier at
D
fj; ltg ; e(j; lt); ujfj;ltg
E
. This cannot be the case.
In the second and last characterization of this section the condition of
reversibility is needed.
A pre-rule ' is said to be reversible if for all problems hN; e; ui and
hN; e0; u0i, such that ei ¡ u^i = ¡(e
0
i
¡ u^i) for all i 2 N ,
¢'i (N; e; u) = ¡¢'i
¡
N; e0; u0
¢
for all i 2 N .
So, if all agents demand at hN; e; ui as much as they supply at hN; e0; u0i,
then their allotment change at hN; e0; u0i is the reversal of that at hN; e; ui.
Clearly, by applying reversibility two times we obtain that a solution only
depends on the demands and the supplies. That is, if ' is a reversible rule
and hN; e; ui and hN; e0; u0i are two problems such that ei ¡ u^i = e
0
i ¡ u^
0
i for
all i 2 N , then
¢'i (N; e; u) = ¢'i
¡
N; e0; u0
¢
for all i 2 N .
In particular, this means that reversibility implies peaks-onliness.
Furthermore, we need an equal-treatment condition in the following the-
orem.
A pre-rule ' is said to be equally-treating if for all problems hN; e; ui and
all i; j 2 N , such that ei ¡ u^i = ej ¡ u^j ,
¢'i (N; e; u) = ¢'j (N; e; u) .
The equal-treatment condition we introduce here is stronger than the
equal-treatment condition introduced in Klaus, Peters and Storcken [6] for
reallocation rules.
By de¯nition the uniform reallocation rule satis¯es reversibility and equal-
treatment. The following theorem says that it is the only such rule which
in addition is strategy-proof.
Theorem 6.4. The uniform reallocation rule is the only reversible, equally-
treating and strategy-proof rule.
Proof. Let ' be such a rule. By reversibility it is su±cient to consider
only problems with excess demand. Let hN; e; ui be a problem such that
z(N; e; u) > 0. We prove that '(N; e; u) = U r(N; e; u).
Because ' only depends on demands and supplies it is without loss of
generality to suppose that u^i = u^j for all i; j 2 N and 2u^i ¡ e ¸ 0 for all
i 2 N .
Without loss of generality suppose D(N; e; u) = f1; 2; : : : ;mg =: M .
Consider e 2 IRN+ such that ek · u^k for all k 2 M , and ek = ek for all
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k 2N ¡M . Let ¸(e) = jfk 2M j ek 6= 0gj. Let O(e) = fk 2M j ek = 0g.
By induction on t we prove that for all such e with ¸(e) · t,
'(N; e; u) = U r(N; e; u).(15)
Clearly, this is su±cient.
Because N and u are ¯xed, we suppress these symbols from notation in
the rest of this proof.
By Corollary 6.2
'j(e) = u^j = U
r
j (e) for all j =2M .(16)
Basis: ¸(e) = 0
Then equal-treatment and (16) yield (15).
Induction step: Let ¸(e) = t+ 1.
Suppose (15) does not hold. Then, by (16), there is a demander, say i,
such that 'i(e) 6= U
r(e). We deduce a contradiction.
By equal-treatment, U r
k
(e) = U r
l
(e) and 'k(e) = 'l(e) for all k; l 2 O(e).
Therefore, by feasibility, it is without loss of generality to suppose that
i =2 O(e). Now there are two cases; both yield a contradiction.
Case 1: 'i(e) < U
r
i (e).
Hence, 'i(e) < u^i. Let e
0 2 IRN
+
such that e0
k
= ek for all k 2 N ¡fig and
e0i = 0. By Lemma 6.1, 4'i(e
0) · 4'i(e). Because 4U
r
i (e
0) ¸ 4U ri (e), it
follows by our induction hypothesis that
¢U ri (e) = U
r
i (e)¡ ei · U
r
i
¡
e0
¢
= 'i(e
0) · 'i(e)¡ ei =4'i(e);
contradicting our starting point.
Case 2: 'i(e) > U
r
i (e).
Let e0 be as in Case 1. Then, U ri (e) < u^i. Hence, in this case 4U
r
i (e
0) =
4U ri (e). Now, it is su±cient to prove that
4'i(e
0) ¸ 4'i(e),(17)
because then, similarly to Case 1, a contradiction is easily deduced. Let
e; e0 2 IRN+ such that
u^k ¡ ek = ¡ (u^k ¡ ek) forall k 2 N
and
u^k ¡ ¹e
0
k = ¡
¡
u^k ¡ e
0
k
¢
forall k 2 N:
Then, by reversibility, we have
4'i(e) = ¡4'i(e) and(18)
4'i(e
0) = ¡4'i(e
0).(19)
If 'i(e
0) = u^i, then 'i(e
0) = u^i and clearly 4'i(e
0) ¸ 4'i(e). If 'i(e
0) 6= u^i,
then by Lemma 6.1
4'i(e
0) · 4'i(e).
Therefore by (18) and (19) we obtain (17).
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7. Overview, Sensitivity Analysis, and Independence of the
Conditions
In the preceding sections eight characterizations of the uniform realloca-
tion rule were presented. To illustrate the relation between these results,
we start this section with a schematic overview of these results. Combin-
ing some of the results immediately yields an ninth characterization (The-
orem 7.1) by means of bilateral consistency, monotonicity and the dummy
property.
Next, we discuss the sensitivity of the results with respect to variations
of the model assumptions.
Finally, independence of the conditions in the characterizations is demon-
strated.
Overview of the Results
The following diagram illustrates the logical connections between the re-
sults of the foregoing sections.
In the sequel we use the following abbreviations.
PO Pareto optimality
PSO peaks-onliness
EF envy-freeness
PM population monotonicity
EM (endowment) monotonicity
DP dummy property
BEP boundedness by endowments and peaks
BC bilateral consistency
IR individual rationality
SP strategy-proofness
RE reversibility
ET equal-treatment
Figure 1 enters here.
Theorem 7.1 (which is added to the diagram) is directly implied by
Lemma 4.3 and Theorem 5.1.
Theorem 7.1. The uniform reallocation rule is the only monotonic rule
satisfying bilateral consistency and the dummy property.
Sensitivity Analysis
The table below indicates the e®ect of four di®erent model variations on
the obtained results. The entries in the cells indicate whether the results
remain true. The details are discussed below.
Table 1 enters here.
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(1) In the model presented here, initial endowments and allotments were
restricted to non-negative numbers. In other settings one might allow
agents to be in debt. In that case, negative endowments and, as a
consequence, negative allotments are admitted. Most of the results
remain true with little changes in the proofs. In case of bilateral
consistency, mean leftover changes for the remaining agents are no
longer subject to a non-negativity restriction. The same holds for
envy-freeness. This does not a®ect the proofs. However, the proof of
Corollary 6.2 is not valid any more. It is an open question whether
Corollary 6.2 or Theorem 6.3 hold in this setting. For Theorem 6.4
there is an alternative proof which is not presented here because of
space limitations.
(2) If we suppose that the endowments and the peaks are not only non-
negative but also bounded from above, all results except Theorem 6.4
remain valid. Of course, envy-freeness and bilateral consistency must
be adapted to this new situation similarly as in the original model, to
guarantee that the (adjusted) endowments, which are used in these
conditions, are well-de¯ned. In the proof of Theorem 6.4 we cannot
apply reversibility because the reversed problems are not necessarily
well-de¯ned in this setting.
(3) Up to now, we assumed that the set of potential agents is in¯nite. This
assumption is crucial for the proof of Theorem 3.2 where we duplicate
the number of agents to exploit population monotonicity. It is an
open problem whether the characterization of Theorem 3.2 holds for
a ¯nite set of potential agents. All other results remain true because
the proofs of these theorems apply to a ¯xed number of agents.
(4) The last model variation we consider concerns the domain of the pref-
erences. We have assumed throughout that the preferences of the
agents are single-peaked and continuous. In fact continuity is only
needed to prove Lemma 6.1. Whether the characterizations based on
this lemma, Theorem 6.3 and Theorem 6.4, hold true for the whole
class of single-peaked preferences is not yet clear. All other results
remain valid.
Independence of the Characterizing Conditions
The logical independence of the characterizing conditions in all theorems
discussed in the previous sections and earlier in this section is proven by
means of eight reallocation (pre-)rules. These (pre-)rules are de¯ned below.
The endowment pre-rule 'e assigns to every individual at every problem
hN; e; ui the initial endowment:
'e(N; e; u) := e:
In case of excess demand (supply), the hierarchical rule 'h satiates all sup-
pliers (demanders) and the demanders (suppliers) according to their number.
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So in case of z(N; e; u) ¸ 0,
'hi (N; e; u) := u^i
if i =2 D(N; e; u) and
'hi (N; e; u) := minfu^i; ei + s(N; e; u)¡
X
j2D(N;e;u);j<i
4'hj (N; e; u)g
otherwise. In case of z(N; e; u) · 0, 'h is de¯ned similarly.
The following maximally satiating rule 'max satiates as many agents as
possible. Let z(N; e; u) > 0 andD(N; e; u) = f1; 2; : : : ; dkg. Let d1(N; e; u) =
: : : = dt1(N; e; u) < dt1+1(N; e; u) = : : : = dt2(N; e; u) < : : : < dtr (N; e; u) =
: : : = dk(N; e; u). Then,
'maxi (N; e; u) := u^i
if i =2 D(N; e; u) and
'maxi (N; e; u) := minfu^i; ei +
1
ts ¡ ts¡1
(s(N; e; u)¡
X
j·ts¡1
4'j(N; e; u))g
if i 2 D(N; e; u); ts¡1 < i · ts. Hence, demanders are satiated according to
their claims. First minimal demands are satiated uniformly. If there is some
supply left, then the next smallest demands are satiated, and so on:
In case of z(N; e; u) < 0, 'max is de¯ned similarly.
The following rule is a variation of 'max.
¹'max(N; e; u) :=
½
'max(N; e; u) if z(N; e; u) > 0 and
U r(N; e; u) if z(N; e; u) · 0:
The rule '0 is equal to the uniform reallocation rule except for those
problems hN; e; ui where all peaks are zero. In that case all agents except
agent n, where N = f1; : : : ; ng, are satiated and feasibility of the allocation
is adjusted on the account of n. So, if u^ 6= 0 (the zero vector), then
'0(N; e; u) := U r(N; e; u).
If u^ = 0, then
'
0
i
(N; e; u) :=
½
0 for i < n and
s(N; e; u) for i = n.
The following rule ¹'0 is a variation of '0. Instead of adjusting feasibility
on the account of n this is done on the account of the highest numbered
supplier. So, if u^ 6= 0, then
¹'0(N; e; u) := U r(N; e; u)
For u^ = 0 let k := max fi j i 2 S(N; e; u)g. Then,
¹'
0
i (N; e; u) :=
½
0 for all i 2 N ¡ fkg and
s(N; e; u) for i = k.
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The following rule ~' is a rule which is not peaks-only. Let hN; e0; u0i be
a problem with e0 =
D
5
2
; 0; : : : ; 0
E
, u^0i = 0 for i > 2 and u
0
1 = u
0
2 such that
u0
1(x) = ¡
¯¯¯
3
2
¡ x
¯¯¯
for x 2 [0;1). Then, ~' is de¯ned by
~'(N; e; u) :=
(
U r(N; e; u). if hN; e; ui 6= hN; e0; u0i andD
1; 3
2
; 0; : : : ; 0
E
otherwise.
Finally the rule '^ satiates all agents as much as possible except those with
the greatest demand (supply) in case of excess demand (supply). Feasibility
is adjusted on their account. If z(N; e; u) > 0, then
'^i(N; e; u) :=
8<
:
u^i if i =2 D(N; e; u) and
minfu^i; ei + °g if i 2 D(N; e; u)¡G and
ei ¡ ¸ if i 2 G,
where G = argmaxi2D(N;e;u) di(N; e; u) and ° and ¸ are determined by fea-
sibility and the range restriction ei ¡ ¸ ¸ 0 (i 2 G) such that ° is maximal
and ¡¸ is minimal.
In case of z(N; e; u) · 0, '^ is de¯ned similarly.
The following table shows which of the previous pre-rules satis¯es which
of the characterizing conditions. The last nine rows of this table indicate for
each characterization and each (pre-)rule which condition is not satis¯ed by
the (pre-)rules while all other characterizing conditions are satis¯ed.
Table 2 enters here.
The last table below illustrates the trade-o®s between the di®erent char-
acterizations. Roughly speaking there are four groups of conditions; I con-
ditions present in all characterizations (and therefore not interesting with
respect to a trade-o® discussion), II conditions of equity, III conditions re-
lating di®erent problems, and IV conditions that bound the outcome.
Table 3 enters here.
Conditions of the ¯rst three groups appear in all characterizations. The
last group is only present, when bilateral consistency, which also belongs
to the second group, is one of the characterizing conditions. Clearly the
price which has to be paid for using this hybrid condition of group II and
III is either a relatively strong condition of group IV or the weaker dummy
property in combination with strategy-proofness or monotonicity. Compar-
ing Theorems 6.3 and 6.4 we see that the trade-o® of relaxing the equity
condition is compensated by the relatively strong reversibility condition of
group IV.
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Figure 1
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
e 2 IRN e 2 [0; b] ; N µ f1; : : : ;mg ; u arbitrary
b 2 IR+ m ¸ 3 single-peaked
instead of instead of instead of instead of
e 2 IRN+ e 2 IR
N
+ N ½ IN u single-peaked
and continuous
Th 3.1
PO, PSO, yes yes yes yes
EF
Th 3.2
PO, PM, yes yes ? yes
EF
Th 4.4
PO, EM, yes yes yes yes
EF
Th 5.1
PO, BC, yes yes yes yes
BEP
Th 5.2
PO, BC, yes yes yes yes
IR
Th 5.3
PO, BC, yes yes yes yes
EF
Th 6.3
PO, BC, ? yes yes ?
SP, DP
TH 6.4
PO, ET, yes ? yes ?
SP, RE
TH 7.1
PO, BC, yes yes yes yes
EM, DP
Table 1
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'e 'h 'max ¹'max '0 ¹'0 ~' '^
PO N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
PSO Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y
EF Y N N N N N Y N
PM Y Y Y Y N N N N
EM Y Y N N Y N N N
BC Y N N N Y N N Y
BEP Y Y Y Y N N N N
IR Y Y Y Y N N Y N
SP Y Y N Y Y N N Y
DP Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y
ET Y N Y Y N N Y Y
RE Y Y Y N N N N Y
Th 3.1 PO EF EF EF EF EF PSO EF
Th 3.2 PO EF EF EF - - PM {
Th 4.4 PO EF EF EF EF EF EM {
Th 5.1 PO BC BC BC BEP BEP { BEP
Th 5.2 PO BC BC BC IR IR BC IR
Th 5.3 PO { { { EF { BC EF
Th 6.3 PO BC BC BC DP SP { {
Th 6.4 PO ET SP RE { { { {
Th 7.1 PO BC BC BC DP { { EM
Y The rule satis¯es the condition in question.
N The rule does not satisfy the condition in question.
Table 2
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Th Th Th Th Th Th Th Th Th
3.1 3.2 4.4 5.1 5.2 5.3 6.3 6.4 7.1
I Conditions present in
all characterizations
PO £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £
II Conditions relating
di®erent problems
PM £
EM £ £
SP £ £
PSO £
RE £
III Conditions of
equity
BC also group II £ £ £ £ £
EF £ £ £ £
ET £
IV Conditions bounding
the outcome
IR £
BEP £
DP £ £
£ The condition in question (row) is part of the corresponding
characterization (column).
Table 3
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